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PREAMBLE PREEMPTION AND THE
CHALLENGED ROLE OF FAILURE TO WARN AND
DEFECTIVE DESIGN PHARMACEUTICAL CASES
IN REVEALING SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, MARKETING
MISCHIEF, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Teresa Curtin* & Ellen Relkin **

I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2006, the Bush administration articulated a position in
favor of a broad conflict preemption doctrine' that would immunize
pharmaceutical manufacturers from civil liability when the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") had previously granted permission to
place a prescription drug on the market.2 This was accomplished through
* Teresa Curtin is an associate at Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., a law firm that acts as
plaintiffs' counsel in pharmaceutical product liability litigations nationwide, including in many
litigations mentioned in this Article. She holds a law degree from New York University School of
Law where she was a Root Tilden Scholar and is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Princeton
University.
**
Ellen Relkin is of counsel to Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C. and represents plaintiffs in
pharmaceutical product liability and toxic tort cases. She is certified by the New Jersey Supreme
Court as a Certified Civil Trial Attorney. She is an elected member of the American Law Institute,
is a chair of the Toxic, Environmental and Pharmaceutical Torts Section of the American
Association for Justice and a fellow of the Roscoe Pound Foundation. She holds a law degree from
Rutgers School of Law and an undergraduate degree from Cornell University where she graduated
cum laude with distinction in all subjects.
1. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006). Specifically, the comments on the product
liability implications of the proposed rule ("the preamble") state, inter alia, that "[s]tate law
actions ... threaten [the] FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible
for evaluating and regulating drugs." Id. at 3935; see also, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing and quoting the preamble).
2. This dramatic departure from the former judicial and FDA recognition of state common
law claims in the context of pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA, first manifested itself in amicus
briefs in ongoing litigation prepared at the direction of the Bush administration's former Chief
Counsel Daniel E. Troy, supporting the manufacturers' argument that federal law preempts state
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3
a preamble to a new regulation in the Federal Register related to
prescription drug labeling formats that declared compliance with FDA
requirements for drug labeling preempts state tort law claims, without
any notice and comment period for the public or interest groups to
respond.4 If federal preemption was held to apply to pharmaceutical
companies, a preemption defense could obliterate failure to warn or
defective design drug cases. 5 Because federal law does not recognize
common law claims. See Congressman Maurice Hinchey, FDA Is Placing Corporations Above
Public, http://www.house.gov/hinchey/issues/fda.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). This web site lists
documentation that shows Chief Counsel Troy's involvement with manufacturers, including a
sworn affidavit discussing a speech that Troy made at a conference on drug and medical device
defense attorneys in which Troy allegedly actively solicited cases where the agency might intervene
to argue preemption and actively encourage defense attorneys to make preemption arguments in
their cases. Beginning in 2002, the FDA filed several amicus briefs arguing that its decisions not to
require suicide warnings preempted claims asserting a state-law duty to provide those same
warnings. See Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and CrossAppellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court's Order Denying Partial Summary
Judgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 15-25, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. (Roerig Div.),
358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498); Amicus Brief for the United States, Kallas
v. Pfizer, Inc. at 23-26 (D. Utah Sept. 15, 2005) (No. 04-CV-00998); Brief for Amicus Curiae the
United States of America at 13-23, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(No. 05-5500); Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 1630, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc. (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 2006) (No. 06-3107). These briefs are available online
at the web site of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research ("AEL"), propreemption organization. AEI, FDA Preemption and Pharmaceutical Product Liability,
(last
http://www.aei.org/research/liability/subjectAreas/pageID. 1378,projectlD.23/default.asp
visited Oct. 2, 2007). The court in Motus avoided the preemption issue. 358 F.3d at 660. The Kallas
litigation settled before there was any decision. The district court in Colacicco agreed with the FDA
and found the SSRI claim preempted. 432 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (currently on appeal).
3. Specifically, the preamble states that "FDA approval of labeling [under the new labeling
requirements] ... preempts conflicting or contrary State law, regulations, or decisions of a court of
law for purposes of product liability litigation." Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling
for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3933-34. The FDA further
stated that it was "the expert Federal public health agency charged by Congress with ensuring that
drugs are safe and effective, and that their labeling adequately informs users of the risks and
benefits of the product and is truthful and not misleading." Id. at 3934. The Bush administration has
also been accused of attempting to bypass the courts and nullify state products liability and
consumer protection law through other agencies adopting such regulatory preambles, including the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Consumer Product Safety Commission. See,
e.g., Richard Frankel, Undue Deference, 42 TRIAL 30, 30-31 (Nov. 2006).
4. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (noting under 21
C.F.R. §§ 10.85(d)(1), (e), (g), this lack of notice and comment period suggests that the preamble is
advisory, binding only on the agency and subject to limited deference); see also Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (limited deference when no notice and comment period).
5. The Bush administration's position has been described by several law commentators as
contrary to the principles of federalism and as a "back-door" attempt to sidestep Congress and
courts after the Bush administration failed to persuade either to adopt a preemption doctrine. See
Jonathan V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument Against Federal
Preemption of State Claimsfor Injuries Resulting From Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 67, 92
(2006); see also In re Zyprexa Prods.Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (noting that if preemption
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private litigants with a cause of action, if the FDA or the manufacturer
negligently fails to consider a potential danger posed by a
pharmaceutical drug, it is the "injured consumer alone who will pay the
price. In addition, because the Supreme Court has found that product
liability claims premised on fraud on the FDA are implicitly preempted,7
such implied preemption would mean that even if market approval was
obtained through intentional misrepresentation on the part of the
manufacturer, by, for example, failing to report studies indicating
substantial risks, injured consumers cannot recover any compensation
for their injuries when a plaintiffs' theory of liability is solely based on
fraud on the FDA. 8 The position taken by the Bush administration in the
2006 preamble has been noted not only to be contrary to Congress's
intent in enacting the FDA 9 and against well-established state and
federal law,' 0 but also against the FDA's prior position recognizing
common law suits as protecting consumers." This has resulted in
occurred, the manufacturer at most would be liable for injuries that occurred up to the first FDA
approved warning label or the time the new label was worded, or perhaps the distribution of the
"Dear Doctor" letters under circumstances of case).
6. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (Pooler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3000 (June 25, 2007) (No. 06-179). While this
statement was made in the context of a medical device case where the plaintiff was found by the
majority of the court not to have a claim for failure to warn or defective design on preemption, the
same result will hold true in pharmaceutical tort cases if the preamble is found to preempt private
consumer failure to warn or defective design tort actions.
7. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001). The United
States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in Desiano v. Warner-Lambert, 467 F.3d 85
(2d. Cir. 2007), to hear the narrow issue of whether "fraud on the FDA" claims are implicitly
preempted. See Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, No. 06-1498, 2007 WL 1420397 (U.S. Sept. 25,
2007); infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
8. Buckman did not involve a drug manufacturer, but a facilitator hired to negotiate the FDA
process, and involved a whole theory of state law liability premised exclusively on FDA fraud.
Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 348 ("[S]tate-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with, and are
therefore impliedly pre-empted by, federal law."). Thus despite manufacturers and some courts such
as Desiano extending Buckman to apply in situations where fraud on the FDA is an element of
proof, thus limiting the ability to get recovery even in the face of known misrepresentations made to
the FDA, arguably Buckman does not extend that far.
9. See, e.g., Brian Wolfman, Why Preemption Proponents Are Wrong, 43 TRIAL 20, 27 &
n.39 (Mar. 2007) (noting that when Congress was considering the legislation that led to the
enactment of the FDA, the end for a private federal cause of action for damages was explicitly
rejected on the grounds that a common law right of action already existed).
10. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (noting that "[n]early
every court to have considered the issue of federal [FDA] preemption before the preamble was
issued has rejected the FDA's current position"). The FDA, in the preamble, claimed that these
cases were based on a misunderstanding that the FDA labeling requirements only established a
minimum safety standard, and not a ceiling. See 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006).
11. Id. at 273-74 (citing prior agency positions in Federal Register where the FDA took a
contrary stance). The Bush administration's position has been described by several law
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organizations such as the prestigious New England Journalof Medicine
12
criticizing the Bush administration's "politicalization" of the FDA. On
June 25, 2007, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Riegel v. Medtronic' 3 on the issue of whether FDA pre-market approval
of a medical device preempts state-law tort claims relating to the safety
or efficacy of the device. Then on September 25, 2007, the Court
14
granted certiorari in Warner- Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent on the narrow
issue of whether any reference to "fraud on the FDA," whether in state5
preemption.
legislation or common law, is void as a result of implied
commentators as contrary to the principles of federalism and as a "back-door" attempt to sidestep
Congress and courts after the Bush administration failed to persuade either to adopt a preemption
doctrine. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 5, at 92-93; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble: FederalAgencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 228
(2007) ("Federal agency momentum towards increased preemption-evidenced by clear statements
in the preambles of issued regulations-fits the broader pattern of what [we] have termed 'backdoor
federalization."').
12. Gregory D. Curfman et al., Editorial, Blueprint for a Stronger Food and Drug
Administration, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1821 (2006). The Bush administration's appointees to the
FDA have been accused of actively soliciting lawyers for the industries they are supposed to be
regulating to offer up cases in which the FDA could file briefs in order to extend FDA preemption
in support of the manufacturers. See, e.g., Thomas Frank, Erasing the Rules, NEWSDAY, Oct. 11,
2004, at A04; Michael Kranish, FDA Counsel's Rise Embodies US Shift, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22,
2002, at Al; Anne C. Mulkern, Watchdogs or Lap Dogs? When Advocates Become Regulators
PresidentBush Has InstalledMore than 100 Top Officials Who Were Once Lobbyists, Attorneys or
Spokespeoplefor Industries They Oversee, DENVER POST, May 23, 2004, at A-01. In addition to this
current threat of implied preemption through the Bush administration, perhaps realizing that they
are on the losing end of the preemption debate, pharmaceutical companies are attempting to avoid
the preemption debate altogether by lobbying state legislatures to pass state laws that preclude state
tort actions against manufacturers of drugs approved for use by the FDA. See, e.g., O'Steen &
O'Steen, supra note 5, at 69 (discussing the issue of pharmaceutical lobbying of state legislatures).
In fact, one state, Michigan, passed a law that explicitly gives immunity to drug manufacturers for
failure to warn if the medicine was in compliance with FDA regulations at the time of sale. MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (2007). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Taylor v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 2003). The only exception to this defense is if
the company fraudulently withheld information that would have led the FDA to recall the drug or
deny approval. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5)(a) (2007). This exception may be difficult for
plaintiffs to use because in Buckman, the Supreme Court suggested that fraud on the FDA claims
may be preempted from being litigated by entities other than the FDA, which would leave Michigan
residents unable to recover under this exception. 531 U.S. at 344. The Michigan statute is currently
under legislative challenge. See H.B. 4044, 4045, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich., as passed by House,
Feb. 22, 2007).
13. 127 S. Ct. 3000 (June 25, 2007) (No. 06-179).
14. Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, No. 06-1498, 2007 WL 1420397 (U.S. Sept. 25,
2007); see supra note 7.
15. The Petitioner manufacturer framed the issues as being:
1. Whether, under the conflict preemption principles in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001), federal law preempts state law to the extent that it requires
the fact-finder to determine whether the defendant committed fraud on a federal agency
that impacted the agency's product approval, where the agency-which is authorized by
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While the Riegel case can be clearly distinguished from pharmaceutical
cases in that the pertinent federal statute involved 6 contains an express
preemption provision, and Warner- Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent deals with
a narrow self-contained issue-essentially whether any reference to
"fraud on the FDA" in state legislation or common law is void as a result
of implied preemption1 7 -- these cases are certainly part of the broader
debate over the extent to which the Bush administration and Congress
may preclude the states from imposing consumer regulations that are
more stringent than the federal government's and viewed as pitting the
states against the manufacturers. 18 Given that federal circuit courts and
state courts are split on this issue, no question exists that sooner or later
the Supreme Court will hear the sister issue of whether pharmaceutical
failure to warn or defective design lawsuits are preempted if a
prescription drug has been approved by federal law. 19
Congress to investigate and determine fraud-has not found any such fraud ....
2. Whether, [under Buckman], federal law preempts the provision in a Michigan statute
that allows a product liability claim to be maintained against a manufacturer of an FDAapproved drug where, without an FDA finding of fraud on that agency, the fact-finder is
required to make a finding under state law as to whether the manufacturer committed
fraud-on-the-FDA and whether, in the absence of that fraud, the FDA would not have
approved the drug.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 2007 WL 1420562 (May 10,
2007) (No. 06-1498). Even if the Supreme Court found that Buckman implicitly preempts "fraud on
the FDA" claims, arguably this would not mean that state tort law claims are barred but merely that
state legislatures would have to rewrite state tort law so as to not refer to fraud on the FDA.
16. This case involved the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 ("MDA"), 21 U.S.C. § 360c
et seq. (2000), to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
(2000). The MDA contains an express preemption provision that forbids a state from adopting any
requirement "which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement" in federal law and
involved what is considered to be the most stringent pre-approval process compared to an earlier
United States Supreme Court medical device case where no preemption was found. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a) (2000). Earlier, federal courts that have heard this issue reached different results on the
issue of the preemption of state statutory and common law claims. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 106 (2d. Cir. 2006) (summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiffs-appellants'
strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligent design, testing, inspection, distribution,
labeling, marketing, and sale claims as to the Evergreen Balloon Catheter, a PMA-approved medical
device); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting
difference between FDCA and FDA preemption issues).
17. See supra note 8.
18. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Supreme Court to Weigh Limits on Cases Involving Medical
Devices, N.Y. TiMES, June 26, 2007, at C3.
19. See infra note 112 and accompanying notes discussing Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384,
2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2007), which is the first top state court in which the United States
Supreme Court has been asked by the manufacturer to consider granting certiorari on this issue. A
number of cases rejected any argument of preemption based on the FDA preamble. See, e.g., In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2007 WL 1952964, at *8-9 (E.D. La. July 3, 2007); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 270-78; Perry v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 456 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Adesina v. Aladan Corp., 438 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337-38
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This Article is not intended to discuss the legal arguments against
the preemption of state tort law claims for pharmaceutical
manufacturers' failure to warn or defective design which has been
discussed recently by a number of commentators 20 and courts, 21 but
weighs in on this preemption debate in a practical manner. We suggest
that understanding lack of "adequacy and candor of representations to
22
the FDA and of robustness of inquiry and decisions of the FDA" is
important in understanding the crucial role that litigation plays in
protecting the general public, and is critical given the current FDA
preemption debate and efforts in Congress to reform the FDA
23
postmarket drug decision making and oversight process. First we
discuss the important gaps in the ascertainment and reporting of adverse
effects associated with prescription drugs.2 4 We then discuss the critical
role that state and federal common law litigation plays in protecting the
general public from scientific fraud, marketing mischief, and conflicts of
interest 25 in a world where pharmaceutical companies are estimated to
spend as much as $12 billion annually marketing to physicians through
in-office promotion, hospital promotions, and journal advertising.2 6
Finally, we return to the issue of preemption and ask whether the FDA
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 (D. Neb. 2006) (rejecting FDA
preemption); McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286, 2006 WL 2819046, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept.
29, 2006) ("The Preamble, without more, does not signal to this Court Congressional intent to
obviate state law."); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash.
2006) ("FDA regulations provide only the minimum requirements... compliance with those
regulations does not necessarily establish that the warnings at issue were adequate."); Deutsch v.
Wyeth, Inc., HRT Mass Tort Case Code 266, MID-L-998-06 MT (N.J. Super. Ct. June 22, 2007)
(order denying defendant's motion for partial summary judgment); Transcript of Oral Argument at
585:21-586:9, Doherty v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. ATL-L-0638-05-MT (N.J. Super. Ct. June 9,
2006) (on file with author) (Judge Higbee stating on the record that the FDA's preemption preamble
is "a political statement" that is "contrary to all the law on preemption"). A number of other cases
adopted FDA preemption. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 538 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (deferring to FDA preemption preamble).
20. See, e.g., O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 5; Wolfman, supra note 9; Robert L. Rabin,
Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 293 (2007) (discussing the
implications of agency initiated preemption).
489 F.Supp. 2d at 240-41.
21. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods.Liab. Litig.,
22. Id. at 240.
23. For example, the FDA has recently announced a plan to do a comprehensive assessment
of the safety of drugs eighteen months after introduction, but no starting date for this plan has yet
been announced and the assessment will be due eighteen months after that. See Gardiner Harris,
F.D.A. Installs Drug Reviews at 18 Months; Critics Say More Changes Are Needed, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2007, at A17.
24. See infra Part 11.
25. See infra Part II.
26. Stephanie Saul, Doctors and Drug Makers: A Move to End Cozy Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 2007, at C10.
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might possibly be retreating from its 2006 preamble preemption
position, albeit in an impractical and unpredictable manner.2 7 We
conclude that the FDA current postmarketing scheme is incapable of
protecting consumers from pharmaceutical manufacturer's misconduct,
and that lawsuits brought by private litigants provide a vital and essential
role in discovering the hidden dangers of drugs currently on the market.
II.

IMPORTANT GAPS

IN THE ASCERTAINMENT AND REPORTING OF

ADVERSE EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

In the past decade, and prior to that, several widely used
prescription medications have been removed from the market either
voluntarily, or pursuant to FDA request, upon reports that such
medicines were causing life threatening adverse effects, and in some
cases deaths.28 Withdrawal is virtually never the result of the FDA
initiating formal proceedings to remove a drug because, as the Director
of New Drugs at the FDA, Dr. John Jenkins, recently acknowledged, in
the context of an FDA expert advisory panel recommending an outright
ban of over-the-counter pediatric cold products for children under the
age of six, a forced withdrawal requiring a rule-making process could
take "many years" to carry out. 29 The FDA has been criticized for taking
"years to acknowledge risks to millions of patients that had been
apparent to some researchers. 3 ° Judge Weinstein, in rejecting a
pharmaceutical company's preemption defense noted that "[i]t is
apparent ... that the FDA's own research is limited and that it relies
heavily on the self-motivated representations and studies by the
of
"lack
that
the
industry,",3 1 suggesting
pharmaceutical
27. See infra Part III.D.
28. For example, the FDA has already requested voluntary withdrawal of two drugs in 2007.
Pergolide drug products used to treat Parkinson's disease, based on serious risk of damage to
patients' heart valves on March 29, 2007. FDA, FDA Public Health Advisory:
Pergolide (marketed as Permax), Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/advisory/
pergolide.htm. It similarly requested the voluntary withdrawal of Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Corporation's Zelnorm, used for the treatment of irritable bowel syndrome, based on identified
increased risk of serious cardiovascular adverse events on March 30, 2007. FDA, FDA Public
Mar. 30, 2007,
as Zelnorm),
Advisory:
Tegaserod maleate (marketed
Health
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/advisory/tegaserod.htm. The FDA generally posts recalls, market
withdrawals, and safety alerts of the last sixty days on its website at http://www.fda.gov/
opacom/7alerts.html, with a complete list of recalls available on the FDA enforcement list at
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/enforce.html.
29. Gardner Harris, F.D.A. Panel Urges Ban on Cold Medicinesfor Child Colds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2007, at Al.
30. Harris, supra note 23, at A17.
31. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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adequate... [FDA] supervision of the pharmaceutical industry" is
actually a factor to be considered in "the larger legal and factual context"
in which the determination of fact and damages is made in
pharmaceutical tort cases. 32 The removal of drugs from the market
almost uniformly shows that there are "often important gaps in the
ascertainment and reporting of adverse effects associated with
prescription drugs, and the balance of information presented to
physicians about the risks and benefits of medications may understate
the former and inflate the latter. 3 3 The danger of hidden adverse drug
effects is that even a relatively small risk of a serious adverse effect can
translate into a high number of consumers killed or hurt by such adverse
effects, due to the vast number of prescriptions written for popular
drugs. For example, related to the selective COX-2 inhibitor drug Vioxx,
at the time of its withdrawal, more than two million patients around the
world were taking the drug, leading to an estimated 88,000 to 140,000
Americans suffering Vioxx-related heart attacks, strokes, and other
serious medical problems.3 4
A.

The Problem:Limited U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Post-ApprovalAuthority Over Pharmaceuticals

Once the FDA approves a drug, "the FDA [does] not have the
explicit authority to require that drug sponsors take other safety

32. Id. at 239.
33. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avom, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297
JAMA 308, 308 (2007); see also David B. Ross, The FDA and the Case of Ketek, 356 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1601, 1601 (2007).
34. See David J. Graham et al., Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac
Death In PatientsTreated With Cyclo-Oxygenase 2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-SteroidalAntiInflammatory Drugs: Nested Case-Control Study, 365 LANCET 475, 480 (2005); see also
Memorandum from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to the Democratic Members of the Gov't Reform
Comm., Re: The Marketing of Vioxx to Physicians, at 4 (May 5, 2005), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20050505113149-41995.pdf [hereinafter Waxman Report]
(citing Carolanne Dai, Randall S. Stafford & G. Caleb Alexander, National Trends in
Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use Since Market Release, 165 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 171,
171-77 (2005)). This Report has been described as "the most extensive account ever provided to
Congress of a drug company's efforts to use its sales force to market to physicians and overcome
health concerns." Id. at 1. Merck's latest annual report estimated that 105 million prescriptions for
Vioxx were written from May 1999 through August 2004 and states that Merck faces legal claims in
27,400 product liability suits, involving 46,100 plaintiff groups in the United States and also is a
defendant in 264 class actions related to the use of Vioxx. Merck & Co., Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 5, 16 (Feb. 28, 2007). Merck has admitted that during 2006, "the Company spent $500
million, including $175 million in the fourth quarter, in the aggregate in legal defense costs
worldwide" and recorded charges of $673 million to increase the reserve solely for its future legal
costs to $858 million. Id. at 17.
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actions" 35 and "has limited authority to require that sponsors conduct
postmarket safety studies"3 6 or ensure compliance with suggested
changes in labeling or marketing practices. 37 The limited FDA postapproval authority was the subject of a 2006 Government Accountability
Office ("GAO") Report to Congress, 38 which reported a lack of coherent
decision-making process for postmarket drug safety, the need for
systematic tracking of postmarket drug safety issues, and explicitly
recommended that the FDA be granted greater authority to order
postmarketing studies by drug manufacturers.39 In addition, a September
2006 extensive 350 page report by the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academies of Science,40 which is considered to be one of the
most important medical advisory organizations in the country, criticized
the FDA as being "rife with internal squabbles and hobbled by
underfinancing, poor management and outdated regulations. 4 1 The
Institute Report made twenty-five specific recommendations, many of
which would require Congressional authorizations, including that new
drugs should be approved for only five year periods so the FDA can
thoroughly review postmarket safety questions; newly-approved drugs
should display a black triangle on their label to warn consumers that the
drug is new and that their safety is more uncertain than older drugs; drug
35. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA'S
POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 10 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 GAO
Report].
36. Id. at 11; see also Bruce M. Psaty & Curt D. Furberg, Rosiglitazone and Cardiovascular
Risk, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2522, 2523 (2007) (noting that while FDA frequently requires
postmarket studies to address safety issues, only about a quarter of the required phase 4 postmarket
trials were completed and noting the inadequate designs of such studies).
37. See Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 33, at 308.
38. See 2006 GAO Report, supra note 35, at 9-12.
39. See id. at 5-6. While this may change as a result of new legislation, see infra note 45, until
now the FDA has had limited authority to require drug manufacturers to conduct postmarket safety
studies. It may impose such post market studies during the premarketing stage under 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.510 (2007) as a condition of accelerated approval of new drugs for serious or life-threatening
illnesses to allow the FDA to more quickly approve potentially life-saving drugs. Second, under 21
C.F.R. § 314.610(b)(1) (2007), the FDA can require postmarket studies as part of pre-marketing
approval where human efficiency studies are not ethical or feasible due to the nature of the drug.
The only postmarket situation where the FDA can currently require that drug sponsors conduct
postmarket studies is under the Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003 when such studies are needed
to provide adequate labeling to ensure the safe and effective use in children. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355c(b) (2000). In addition, even when postmarket studies are ordered, the FDA has remarkably
little enforcement authority to force a manufacturer to comply with such studies.
40. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY
SYSTEM, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE
al.
eds.,
2007),
available at http://search.nap.edu/napPUBLIC
(Alina
Baciu
et
cgi/skimit.cgi?recid= 11750&chap=l-14 [hereinafter INSTITUTE REPORT].
41. Harris, supra note 23, at A17.
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advertisements should be banned during this initial period; the FDA
should be given the authority to issue fines, injunctions, and withdrawals
when pharmaceutical manufacturers fail to complete required safety
studies-which the manufacturers often do. 42 The Institute Report also
recommends a six year term for the FDA commissioner-perhaps an
implicit recognition of the problems caused when the FDA is politicized,
as it has been under the Bush administration.4 3 A January 2007 written
response by the FDA to the Institute of Medicine's report, however, has
been described by an Institute author as being "disappoint[ing]" in terms
of how it failed to adopt the Institute's suggestion that the FDA be given
greater authority to access the safety of drugs after they go on the
market. 4 On September 27, 2007, President Bush signed into law the
Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act,45 which is intended to
strengthen the FDA's ability to carry out these tasks. The law has been
described as a "Christmas tree with more moving parts than you can
imagine" by a former FDA general counsel.46 At the time that this
Article went to press, whether the new law will significantly address the
issues brought up in the Institute Report and the 2006 GAO Report is
unclear, in part because how the Act's provisions will be implemented
and their usefulness in protecting public health and safety depends on
the writing of rules and regulations in the days to come. In the
meantime, however, ample examples make clear "a drug's label can vary
in its completeness and
balance and may not be updated in a timely way
47
to reflect new data.
B. Result: Lack of ManufacturerIncentive to Investigate or Report
PotentialAdverse Effects and Massive Settlements Which Results in
ImpairedPrescriptionDecisions
Virtually every major pharmaceutical manufacturer has either been
caught concealing, or is currently accused of concealing, information
related to either the safety or effectiveness of blockbuster prescription
drugs. Some high visibility cases include: Baycol (cerivastatin)
(manufacturer allegedly suppressed knowledge that patients were
42.

See INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 40, at 164-73.

43. See id. at 92-93.
44. See Harris, supra note 23, at A17.
45. See Jeffery M. Drazen, Stephen Morrissey & Gregory D. Curfman, Editorial, Open
Clinical Trials, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 1756 (2007).

46. Gardner Harris, House Passes Bill Giving More Power to the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2007, at A18.
47. Kesselheim & Avom, supra note 33, at 308.
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developing a potentially life-threatening muscle disease, and that the risk
of such condition increased with higher dosages at the time the company
was negotiating with the FDA for approval of the drug at higher
dosages); 48 Bextra (valdecoxib) ($1.2 billion in sales in 2004 allegedly
achieved through Pfizer marketing drug as a "breakthrough" drug
despite Pfizer's knowledge of the drug's lack of superiority and
increased cardiovascular risks and potentially life-threatening skin
reactions); 49 Ortho Evra (manufacturer currently accused of
misrepresenting that birth control contraceptive patch was as safe as oral
contraceptives even though it knew or should have known of excessive
estrogen release); 50 Paxil (paroxetine) (manufacturer allegedly
suppressed studies showing increased risk of suicidal behavior in
children and adolescents taking antidepressant, while releasing the
favorable exculpatory study resulting in $55 million in sales related to
mood disorders); 5' Vioxx (rofecoxib) (manufacturer allegedly
suppressed known cardiovascular dangers of drug and instead waged
aggressive marketing campaign to increase use of drug); 52 Zyprexa
(olanzapine) (30,000 cases brought against manufacturer that allegedly
suppressed knowledge that drug caused hyperglycemia, diabetes, and
excessive weight gain and instead provided false data to physicians).5 3
48. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. The authors' firm has been involved in the
Baycol MDL litigation in federal district court in Minnesota and the Pennsylvania state court.
49. See, e.g., In re Bextra and Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CV05-1699, 2006 WL 2472484, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2006) (discussing allegations). The authors'
law firm is involved in this ongoing litigation and related litigation pending in the New York state
court system. The web sites involving these litigations and supporting documents are at
https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/bextra/
(California) (last visited Oct. 5, 2007), and
http://www.nypscbextracelebrex.com/Home.aspx (New York) (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). New
Jersey mass tort litigation related to this drug is also pending. See NJCourtsOnline.com, Mass
Tort-Bextra/Celebrex, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/bextra-celebrex/index.htm
(last
visited Oct. 5, 2007).
50. See, e.g., Associated Press, Birth Control Patch Linked to Higher Fatality Rate,
MSNBC.coM, July 20, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8565177/; Associated Press & CBS,
Birth Control Patch Users Warned, Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/1 1/11/
earlyshow/health/healthnews/main103761l.shtml. Multi-district litigation alleging that the patch
was defectively designed and that users received inadequate warnings as to the product's sideeffects and safety profile is currently pending in the Northern District of Ohio. See In re Ortho Evra
Prods. Liab. Litig., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1381 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2006). The authors' firm is also
involved in this litigation.
51. See Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Major Pharmaceutical
Firm Concealed Drug Information: GlaxoSmithKline Misled Doctors About the Safety of Drug
Used
to
Treat
Depression
in
Children
(June
2,
2004),
available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/j un/jun2b-04.html.
52. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
53. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). The authors'
firm formerly has been involved in this litigation.
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What these drugs' debacles convincingly demonstrate is that the
current FDA scheme is not protecting public health and safety, leading
to what one recent commentator recently noted would be "the serious
concerns raised by a system that would tolerate both tort preemption and
regulatory failure., 54 After all, what impact are multi-million dollar fines
when a product is considered to be a potential blockbuster product, with
global sales exceeding $586 million in 2000, growth of 84%, and with
forecast sales of $1 billion for the next year? 55 Or when a product is by
56
far a company's most profitable drug, with sales of $4.2 billion a year?
In such situations, the effects of a product withdrawal can go beyond an
immediate loss in product sales and impact the company's long term
revenue potential. 57 From the authors' practical experience in
involvement in numerous pharmaceutical cases over the years, the sad
result is that corporate executives may continue aggressive marketing
campaigns and negotiating with the FDA for approval of additional uses
or higher approved dosages of blockbuster drugs at the time that internal
documents show the company knew or should have known that patients
are developing life-threatening conditions as a result of using a
company's product. These executives' bonuses are tied to year-end
revenues and they may very well be at another company by the time that
the health concerns relating to a product come to light.
In addition, based on their personal experience, the authors of this
Article believe that confidential settlements as a means of hiding
manufacturer misconduct have long been a pervasive problem in mass
tort pharmaceutical product liability cases, where the danger exists that a
54. Wolfman, supra note 9, at 27.
55. See Bayer Reaches Settlement Over Drug Disclosure, HOUSTON BUS. J., Jan. 23, 2007,
available at http://houston.bizjoumals.com/houston/stories/2007/01/22/daily29.html (discussing
Baycol's $8 million settlement involving thirty states); ResearchAndMarkets.com, The Impact of
http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?
Sept. 2001,
Baycol Withdrawal,
the
reportid=1049 (discussing financial data related to Bayer's Baycol). The facts related to Eli Lilly's

alleged misrepresentations and omissions related to this drug are discussed in a security class action
lawsuit brought on the behalf of shareholders. See In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 105,
107-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546, 2004 WL 2190357, at *1-6
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
56. See Alex Berenson, Eli Lilly Said to Play Down Risk of Top Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,

2006, at 1 (discussing how drug manufacturer Eli Lilly is accused of waging a decade-long effort to
play down the health risks of Zyprexa, its best selling medication for schizophrenia, with sales of
$4.2 billion in 2006, based on hundreds of internal documents and e-mail messages among top
company managers). The documents related to The New York Times article were recently found by a

federal judge to be subject to a protective order and ordered to be returned to the defendant. See In
re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
57. See ResearchAndMarkets.com, The Impact of the Baycol Withdrawal, Sept. 2001,
http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?reportid= 1049.
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manufacturer facing a massive number of potential lawsuits will attempt
to settle cases as quietly as possible in an effort to avoid confrontations
with the FDA, bad publicity and attendant stock market changes and/or
additional lawsuits by injured parties who were unaware that the drug
may be the cause of their injury.58 Despite how Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state laws generally require a
showing of "good cause" for restricting access to discovery documents
when necessary "to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, 59 in most
cases where the parties file settlement agreements that include a
provision sealing the discovery documents, the requirement of "good
cause" is ignored by the courts. Thus, "agreeing to a secrecy order may
become a bargaining chip between the parties, with defendants agreeing
more readily to an early settlement if the plaintiff agrees not to disclose
the details of the case to the public." 60 Such sealed orders create a
difficult situation for the plaintiffs lawyer whose ethical obligation lies
in the best possible representation of existing client(s), whose interest
often is obtaining an expeditious settlement versus the plaintiff
attorney's desire to expose important health information learned in
litigation to protect the public or help other prospective plaintiffs. In
reality, disclosure will often weaken the plaintiffs bargaining position
for securing the defendant's acquiescence in discovery of certain
materials, and also damage the plaintiffs ability to maximize the
settlement value. Ethical rules, however, are clear: The plaintiffs
attorney's foremost duty is to act in the best interest of her existing
client.6 1 Any question that such settlement agreements are not
uncommon can be dispelled by simply reading the newspapers. For

58. See Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public
Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 375 (2006)
(noting commonness of "umbrella" protective orders); Charles J. Reed, Confidentiality and the
Courts: Secrecy's Threat to Public Safety, 76 JUDICATURE 308, 308 (1993) ("As a preemptive
measure at the beginning of the discovery process, defense attorneys insist that the plaintiffs
attorney agree to a protective order preventing communication with anyone regarding any
information provided by the manufacturer.").
59. See, e.g., Dorothy J. Clarke, Court Secrecy and the Food and Drug Administration: A
Regulatory Alternative to Restricting Secrecy Orders in Product Liability Litigation Involving FDARegulated Products, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 109, 114 & n.30 (1994) (listing state rules).

60.

Id. at 114.

61.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2004) (advising that a lawyer should not

make extrajudicial statements that may be disseminated to the public if it will materially prejudice
the adjudicative process); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2004) (instructing that a
lawyer should not represent a client if representation will be limited by the lawyer's own or another
client's interests); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983).
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example, in January 2007, The New York Times reported that Eli Lilly
agreed to a $495 million confidential settlement with Zyprexa that
covered more than 18,000 patient claims. 62 An earlier $70063 million
Zyprexa settlement dispensed with approximately 8000 claims.
The problem with this company inertia, deliberate concealment, and
confidential settlement of potential dangers is that most physicians learn
about prescription drugs from publications of clinical trials, promotional
materials, or alert letters that are provided by pharmaceutical
companies. 64 For example, drug industry financing of mandatory
continuing medical education has reportedly nearly quadrupled since
1998, from $302 million to $1.12 billion with over half of all continuing
medical education courses in the United States paid for by drug
companies, resulting in a situation where pharmaceutical companies set
much of the agenda for what doctors learn about drugs. 65 As noted by
then-New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer in his complaint
against GlaxoSmithKline for allegedly misrepresenting, concealing, or
otherwise failing to disclose four studies related to the antidepressant
Paxil: A physician cannot act in accordance with his professional
obligation owed to the patient if the physician's prescribing decision is
based on inadequate or biased information.6 6 Or as recently noted by the
Honorable Judge Weinstein: "But even fine doctors have to rely on, and
could... [be] misled by... incomplete and possibly misleading
information available to them as a result of lack of adequate warnings on
the label and [the manufacturer's] overselling., 67 The current situation is
such that physician reliance on pharmaceutical companies to provide
adequate and accurate safety information has been likened by the
Honorable Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
68
Appeals as reliance on the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse.

62.

Reuters, Settlement on Zyprexa Hurts Results at Eli Lilly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at

C3.
63. Id.
64. See Waxman Report, supra note 34, at 7-16; see also infra notes 84-90 and accompanying
text.
65. Daniel Carlat, Op-Ed., Diagnosis: Conflict of Interest, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A21
("Because pharmaceutical companies now set much of the agenda for what doctors learn about
drugs, crucial information about potential drug dangers is played down, to the detriment of patient
care.") (using Avandia and Vioxx as examples).
66. See supranote 51.
67. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
68. Larrissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner: How Did A Judge With Such Submissive Ideas
Become A Leading Influence On American Legal Opinion?, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, Dec. 10,
2001, at 78, 80-81.
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III. THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE THAT PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
PLAYS IN SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, MARKETING MISCHIEF, AND CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST

As shown above, the lack of postmarketing studies, likely
concealing, underreporting or spinning of adverse reactions, confidential
settlements, and pharmaceutical involvement in mandatory continuing
medical education means that the pharmaceutical companies, not the
FDA, are in effect controlling the flow of information to treating
physicians and the public. This situation leads to three distinct patterns
of manufacturer misconduct consistently discovered through
pharmaceutical products liability litigation: scientific fraud, marketing
mischief, and conflicts of interest. The discussion below is artificial in
that each kind of fraud is focused on in isolation, whereas litigation
demonstrates that pharmaceutical manufacturers may engage in
overlapping combinations of abuses in order to obtain FDA approval
and keep their product on the market.
A. Scientific Fraud
The most common kind of scientific fraud committed by
manufacturers may be the withholding of relevant information from
physicians, the public, and sometimes the FDA, 69 either by withholding
or modifying research results, by spinning the data, by blaming
exclusively other risk factors rather than acknowledging the multifactored role of the drug superimposed on the underlying risk factor, or
by failing to report potential adverse drug reactions timely as required by
the FDA. Recent cases where pharmaceutical manufacturers were
accused of either modifying scientific results or failing to timely report
adverse reactions show that drug companies often downplay serious, if
not potentially life-threatening, side-effects, while trying to expand the
market for their product.
For example, Merck's best selling, non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory
drug, Vioxx, was approved of by the FDA in May 1999 as a safer
alternative for the management of acute pain and the treatment of
69. There is no question that in some circumstances, the FDA has access to adverse effects
rates from competitors related to the same family of drugs, yet has been remarkably slow to act. In
some recent situations, such as the SSRI antidepressants, the FDA had access to adverse effect rates
from different clinical trials at different companies, and yet, as one commentator has noted, was
simply slow to aggregate all the clinical data in order to examine the link between SSRIs and
suicide more systematically. See JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND
COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 359-87 (2004).
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osteoarthritis. "From that date through August 2004, 105 million Vioxx
prescriptions were filled in the U.S. and an undetermined number were
filled outside the U.S."' 70 "In 2003 alone, Merck's worldwide Vioxx
sales totaled $2.5 billion., 71 Merck has been accused of knowing about
the cardiovascular risks of this COX-2 inhibitor since the early
development of this drug, including internal e-mails made public
through litigation in which Merck officials successfully persuaded the
authors of a company sponsored study in 1996-97 to soften their
conclusions as to the potential risk for thrombus formation with this
drug. 72 Yet instead of studying cardiovascular outcomes, Merck
disseminated pooled data from different small studies which falsely
minimized cardiovascular risks to physicians in its "cardiovascular card"
used by sales representatives with doctors, in an effort to promote
Vioxx's cardiovascular safety to physicians.73 In January 1999, Merck
launched its largest study yet of Vioxx, the so-called VIGOR
gastrointestinal outcome research which was designed to compare the
safety of Vioxx compared to a traditional NSAID naproxen related to
rheumatoid arthritis by which the company hoped to expand the drug's
approved uses by the FDA.74 Despite Merck's own chief scientist
Edward Scolnick stating in an internal e-mail that the results were a
"shame" and indicated Merck employees/consultants being right about
COX-2 inhibition possibly increasing cardiovascular risks,75 the
published VIGOR study in the New England Journal of Medicine
emphasized the purported positive gastrointestinal efficacy results. The
published VIGOR study, however, did not contain data on edema and
issues.76
fluid retention at all, despite physician concern related to these
Even more significant, the study obscured the cardiovascular (CV) risk
associated with Vioxx by including data from an interim analysis that
used different endpoint data for cardiovascular and gastrointestinal
events--counting gastrointestinal events for one month longer-a highly
irregular procedure which was not reported in the publication and led to

70. W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would It Have Ended Differently in the European
Union?, 32 Am. J.L. & MED. 365, 365-66 (2006).
71. Id.at366.
72. See Harlan M. Krumholz et al., What Have We Learnt From Vioxx?, 334 BRITISH MED. J.
120, 120 (2007).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 120-21.

75. This e-mail and other e-mails related to the Vioxx litigations are currently available on the
Intemet. See VioxxDocuments.com, Krumholz Vioxx Documents, www.vioxxdocuments.com (last
visited Oct. 6, 2007).
76. See Krumholzetal.,supra note 72, at 121.
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the cardiovascular risk being understated because three additional
myocardial infarctions occurred in the Vioxx group the month after the
researchers stopped counting the cardiovascular events, whereas none
occurred in the control group.7 7 In addition, the cardiovascular risk was
further concealed by presenting the hazard of myocardial infarctions as
if the naproxen group was the intervention group and without reporting
the absolute number of cardiovascular events, even though all other
results were reported appropriately with rofecoxib as the intervention
group. 78 Finally, the VIGOR study suggested a "naproxen hypothesis"
which suggested that the difference in cardiovascular events between the
Vioxx group and naproxen group was because naproxen allegedly had a
strong cardioprotective effect, despite there being no accepted medical
evidence that naproxen was cardioprotective and despite the fact that
Merck knew it was concealing data by using different data for
cardiovascular events.79 Sadly, Merck strongly promoted the VIGOR
study-reportedly purchasing nearly one million reprints to circulate to
doctors and other healthcare professionals. 80 Thanks to these revelations
shown through discovery and litigation, the New England Journal of
Medicine re-examined the VIGOR study it published in 2000, and took
the unusual step of publishing an "Expression of Concern" where it
concluded that the Merck-employed authors of the article edited the
manuscript to delete data revealing heart attacks in three of the study
participants. 81 One of the authors, Dr. Alise S.
Reicin served as Merck's
82
lead scientific witness in several of the trials.
B. Marketing Mischief
To make matters worse, when drug manufacturers are confronted
with potential declines in sales due to negative publicity associated with

77.

Id.

78. Id.
79.

Id.

80. Id.
81. See Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Expression of
Concern: Bombardier et al., "Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and
Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis," 353 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2813 (2005); see also
Associated Press, Vioxx Editorial May Bolster Merck Suits, CBSNEwS.coM, Dec. 11, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/1 1/ap/health/printableD8EEBOHGO.shtml.
82. See Thomas, supra note 70, at 365, 367 & n.20 (discussing Merck expert witness being
VIGOR study author). As pointed out, none of the authors of the VIGOR study have publicly

conceded error or taken responsibility for the biased VIGOR presentation, and in fact, two VIGOR
authors continue to collaborate on high profile work with Merck. Krumholz et al., supra note 72, at
121.
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potential negative adverse effects, manufacturers frequently respond by
increasing advertising campaigns, including hiring doctors who are
considered highly respected and influential "thought leaders" in the
respective medical community to promote their drug, even when such
physicians do not actively use the drug during their own practice, 83 and
specifically training sales representatives how to respond to potential
issues.
A good example of documented marketing mischief is a 2005
Congressional Report, which reviewed over 20,000 pages of Merck
internal company documents and found that "[e]ven as evidence
mounted that use of Vioxx was associated with heart attacks and strokes,
physicians continued to prescribe Vioxx to millions of patients," thanks
at least in part to strategies that Merck used to market Vioxx to
physicians.8 4 These efforts included instructing highly trained
representatives to show physicians a pamphlet-the so called "CV
Card"-which was based on data that the FDA considered improper for
a safety analysis that suggested "Vioxx might be 8 to 11 times safer than
other anti-inflammatory drugs, prohibited the representatives from
discussing contrary studies (including those financed by Merck) that
showed increased risks from Vioxx, and launched special marketing
programs-named 'Project XXceleration' and 'Project Offense'-to
overcome the cardiovascular 'obstacle' to increased sales. ' '85 The sales
representatives were trained to use "obstacle handlers" to persuade
doctors that Vioxx is the drug of choice. The Report is worth reading for
its insights into the lucrative hidden world of pharmaceutical sales
representatives and how it shows the incredible lengths 86 that Merck
83. For an example of this from the authors' firm's own practice related to the Parlodel cases,
discussed infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text, Dr. Ted King, the former chairman of the
Johns Hopkins University OB/GYN Department from 1979 to 1983 and the former chair of the
FDA OB/GYN Advisory Committee was hired by Sandoz to write an affidavit to submit to the FDA
on the purported need for Parlodel and to travel and lecture on the need for Parlodel for a consulting
honorarium of $1500 daily (two decades ago). See Deposition of Theodore King at 13:2-13:8,
71:19-72:1, Dunn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (No. 1:98 CV
00912) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). Dr. King's deposition reveals that he had never
prescribed Parlodel to any of his patients and that he recognized that the reason that Sandoz wanted
him involved was simply because it believed he was a leader in the OB/GYN community. Id. at
28:7-28:14, 30:3-30:13, 43:3-43:7, 49:24-50:17, 56:17-56:20. His affidavit on behalf of Parlodel,
however, never stated that he did not prescribe the lactation agent, yet he agreed that physicians
reading his affidavit could believe that he wrote the affidavit based on his own experience as an
obstetrician. Id. at 60:5-60:15.
84. See Waxman Report, supra note 34, at 3.
85. Id.
86. Such instruction included training sales representatives on how to shake hands, eat bread,
and other non-verbal clues. Id.
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went to "exhaustively" train its sales representatives how to persuade
physicians to prescribe Vioxx and other Merck products.87
Significantly, however, the Report showed that after each
development which suggested that Vioxx might pose a heightened risk
of heart attacks and strokes, Merck sent special bulletins or special
messages to its sales force, "directing them to use highly questionable
information to assuage any physician concerns. 88 After the February
2001 FDA Advisory Committee voted that doctors should be informed
about data from the VIGOR study, instead of backing off from its
marketing of Vioxx, Merck launched "Project A&A XXceleration" with
the slogan "In It To Win It" with financial incentives for sales
representatives who helped Merck meet its goal of an increased market
share.89 Similarly, after an August 22, 2001 study published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) raised serious
questions about the safety of Vioxx and the other COX-2 inhibitors,
Merck launched "Project Offense" a major new marketing campaign
with the continued goal of increasing Vioxx's share of the market with
the company again explicitly instructing its sales representatives how to
deal with the cardiovascular safety concerns of Vioxx, including a
decision tree called the "CV Obstacle Response" which again
emphasized the CV Card as a way of assuring physicians about the

87. Id.
88. Id. Among examples of questionable practices, the Waxman Report noted:
After Merck's VIGOR study reported increased heart attack risks, Merck directed its
sales force to show physicians a "Cardiovascular Card" that made it appear that Vioxx
could be 8 to II times safer than other anti-inflammatory drugs. This card omitted any
reference to the VIGOR findings and was based on data FDA considered to be
inappropriatefor a safety analysis.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
After the FDA advisory committee voted that physicians should be informed about the
risks found in the VIGOR study, Merck sent a bulletin to its sales force that advised:
"DO
NOT
INITIATE
DISCUSSIONS
ON
THE
FDA
ARTHRITIS
COMMITTEE... OR THE RESULTS OF THE... VIGOR STUDY." If physicians
asked about the VIGOR study, Merck representatives were directed to respond, "I
cannot discuss the study with you."
Id. (emphasis added).
After the New York Times reported on the cardiovascular dangers of Vioxx, Merck
instructed its field staff to tell physicians that patients on other anti-inflammatory
medications were eight times more likely to die from cardiovascular causes than patients
on Vioxx. The Merck bulletin told its sales force to show physicians the Cardiovascular
Card and state: "Doctor, as you can see, Cardiovascular Mortality as reported in over
6,000 patients was Vioxx .1 vs. NSAIDS .8 vs. Placebo 0."

89. Id. at 23.
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cardiovascular risks and instructing sales representatives to emphasize
allegedly new "efficacy" data. 90
C. Conflict of Interest. The Problem OfPharmaceuticalFundingof
PrivateResearch and UndisclosedInvolvement of Defense Experts in
Research
As already hinted above through the example of Merck pressuring
authors of company-based studies to "soften" their conclusion about the
possible cardiovascular effects of Vioxx, GlaxoSmithKline's
suppression of unfavorable Paxil studies that showed a possible link
and children,9 1
between suicide and SSRI anti-depressants in teenagers
and other numerous real-world examples, only a few of which are
discussed here, the studies upon which a drug's label is based may be
compromised by industry research funding. Such private research
funding may require contractual agreements that allow the company to
delete information from publication or delay publication of results, put
pressure on researchers not to publish negative studies, and, in extreme
cases, wage campaigns to discredit negative studies and destroy the
92
scientists who attempt to publish negative results. Given the enormous
scale of research and educational grants given out by manufacturing
companies, professional journals are noting that they are having a hard
time finding experts in the field to review journal submissions who do
not have industry ties, especially in situations where a particular
93
company may have market dominance over a product. Both legal and
medical commentators have suggested that pressure exerted on
researchers of sponsored research and sponsor control over data may be
common "but because researchers so seldom stand up to their
sponsors ... 'there is no way to know how many negative studies have
been suppressed-or worse, how many negative studies were converted
to positives."'' 94 Until September 2007, there was no requirement that
pharmaceutical manufacturers disclose the results of all clinical trials

90. Id. at 25-26.
91. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
92. See Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238, 1238-43 (1997) (citing, among
others, WESLEY COHEN ET AL., UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RESEARCH CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1994)).
93. Id. at 1242.
94. Susan Haack, Scientific Secrecy and "'Spin": The Sad, Sleazy Saga of the Trials of
Remune, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 63 (2006) (quoting Marcia Angell, Editor-in-Chief of the
New EnglandJournal of Medicine). Haack suggests that "almost every day there is more reason to
believe that the iceberg of corruption is sizable." Id.
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involving humans, although this 95was part of the FDA legislation which
was recently passed in Congress.
An example of how conflict of interest is discovered in the course
of product liability litigation is the Parlodel (bromocriptine mesylate)
lawsuits. Numerous new mothers or their estates sued Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals
Corporation
(now
Novartis
Pharmaceuticals
Corporation) after they suffered hypertension, seizures, strokes,
myocardial infarctions and death after their ingestion of Parlodel for the
prevention of physiological lactation (lactation suppression).9 6 The drug
97
was routinely prescribed to mothers who chose not to breast-feed.
During the course of litigation,98 the plaintiffs through discovery
obtained a document titled Postpartum Stroke-A Twenty Year
Experience, by Dr. Andrea Witlin, Farid Matter, and Dr. Baha M. Sibai,
which had been submitted to and accepted by the prestigious American
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology for publication.9 9 Dr. Sibai was a
defense witness in the case. The study, which claimed to be a twenty
year prospective study of strokes in women following childbirth,
exonerated Parlodel as the cause of strokes, reporting that of the alleged
40,000 women taking Parlodel, only one of these women suffered a
stroke and that not only was Parlodel not a cause of strokes in the
postpartum period, but was actually protective.' 00

95. See Drazen et al., supra note 45, at 1756 (discussing soon to be enacted requirement for
sponsors of all clinically directive therapeutic trials to register their studies at the inception, in
comparison with the past where "a clinical trial could be conducted in secret. The trial's sponsor,
claiming proprietary rights, could keep all information about it, including its very existence, private.
Thus, ifa drug had important adverse effects, this information might never be made public.").
96. For a review of how Sandoz Pharmaceuticals has been noted to have done everything it
could to resist changes to labeling of Parlodel and its later removal from the market, see Margaret
A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, From the Wrong End of the Telescope: A Response to Professor
DavidBernstein, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1983, 1987-88 (2006).
97. However, mother's milk abates naturally in a few days if not stimulated, so in 1994 the
FDA filed proposal to withdraw the approval of the lactation suppression indication. See
Opportunity for a Hearing on a Proposal to Withdraw Approval of the Indication, 59 Fed. Reg.
43,347 (Aug. 23, 1994).
98. The authors' firm was involved in the incident described.
99. The transcripts of the depositions of Drs. Sibai and Witlin related to this office are on file
with the authors.
100. The original manuscript's conclusion in full was that "[a]lthough bromocriptine [Parlodel]
is no longer approved for use in postpartum lactation suppression.., it does not appear to be
etiologic for postpartum stroke as has previously been reported.... Indeed, one might argue that
woman exposed to bromocriptine were at a lower risk .... " Andrea G. Witlin, Farid Mattar & Baha
M. Sibai, Postpartum Stroke: A Twenty-Year Experience 13 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Hofstra Law Review); see generally Deposition of Dr. Baha M. Sibai, Siharath v. Sandoz
Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (testifying as to his findings regarding the
relationship between bromocriptine and postpartum stroke) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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Depositions taken by plaintiffs' attorneys of the study's authors,
Drs. Witkin and Sibai, however, revealed the serious conflicts of
interests in the study-including that Dr. Sibai had been a paid expert
witness for Sandoz in several lawsuits involving Parlodel and admitted
101
They further
his payments averaged $10,000 to $20,000 per year.
revealed the study's obvious flaws including that (1) although the
manuscript described the study as a prospective compilation in a
database of clinical data on women who suffered strokes, no prospective
database ever existed; 10 2 (2) no written criteria was set for the
inclusion/exclusion of patients in the study, much less any clear
definition of "stroke"; 10 3 and (3) the manuscript was allegedly based on a
single spreadsheet that consisted of thirty-three columns of information
for each of the twenty women identified as having a stroke, yet many of
the columns were missing information, including that in the "postpartum
medications" column which formed the basis for the Parlodel
conclusions, no information was available for half of the women with
04
As a result, the
respect to their use of postpartum medicines.
plaintiffs' attorneys wrote a detailed letter to the American Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynecology,10 5 which resulted in further review of the
paper. It was then significantly revised so that the study was now
identified as being retrospective, not prospective (which is significant in
that prospective studies are considered to have greater scientific weight
and be less subject to the reviewer bias phenomenon). Even more
significant, unlike the conclusion of the earlier-accepted manuscript,
which had explicitly stated that Parlodel "does not appear to be etiologic
for postpartum stroke," the0 6final version of the study entirely omitted
any discussion of Parlodel.1
101.

This Parlodel saga is written about in JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: How

MEDICINE'S

COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN

ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 42-44 (2005)

(concluding that after reviewing the doctor's depositions that "some of the data were incomplete,
unreliable, unverifiable, and nonreproducible" and "[c]learly the research of Drs. Sabai [sic] and
Witlin was not only flawed, but contaminated by Dr. Sabai's [sic] financial conflict of interest").
102. See, e.g., Deposition of Andrea Witlin at 48:6-50:2, 50:20-51:6, 99:4-99:13, Brasher v.
Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review).
103. See, e.g., id. at 59:21-69:17, 75:6-75:19, 76:40-76:25, 92:7-92:19.
104.

See id. at 76:14-76:19, 88:7-88:8, 92:7-93:12, 94:5-95:23.

105. Letter from Jerry Kristal to Frederick P. Zuspan, M.D., Editor-in-Chief, American Journal
of Obstetrics and Gynecology (Aug. 6, 1999) (on file with author).
106. The conclusion of the earlier-accepted manuscript explicitly stated that Parlodel "does not
appear to be etiologic for postpartum stroke." See Witlin, Mattar & Sibai, supra note 100, at 13.
Unlike the earlier manuscript, the conclusion in the published version was simply that "postpartum
and nonpreventable complication of
stroke remains an uncommon, multifactorial,
pregnancy .... We found an association between postpartum stroke and hypertensive disorders of
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The key is that if Drs. Witlin and Sibai had not been deposed and
asked the questions they were asked, the conflict of interest and the
numerous defects in the study would never had been discovered. The
original study that exonerated Parlodel would have been published by
this well-respected journal and would have been used in the Parlodel
litigation or even by Novartis to try to bring the product back on the
market. Despite their violations of the American Journal of Obstetrics
and Gynecology's policies on conflicts of interest and the implicit
acknowledgment of the flaws as mandated by the re-write of the
manuscript omitting the Parlodel conclusion, Drs. Sibai and Witlin have
continued to publish in the American Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynecology without any apparent censure, although Dr. Sibai has
recently been censured by the journal for his involvement in another
study in which a study was misrepresented as a randomized trial when it
the journal and when it was presented at
was submitted and accepted by
07
1
meeting.
annual
the journal's
D. A Quick Note: Is The FDA Retreatingfrom Its
Preemption Position?
In an amicus letter brief filed in Perry v. Novartis Pharmaceutical
Corporation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania on September 21, 2006, the FDA, while continuing to
assert that "state tort claims premised on the defendants' failure to
provide a warning that FDA had specifically considered and rejected as
scientifically unsubstantiated during the relevant period,"' 0 8 expressly
disclaimed any intention to "occupy the field."' 0 9 The FDA further made
clear that failure to warn claims that do not directly conflict with the
FDA regulatory decisions remain viable, noting that "federal regulations
explicitly recognize that manufacturers can, and in some limited
instances must, modify their labels to add new warnings of hazards
associated with the drug without awaiting prior FDA approval."" 0 Thus,
Andrea G. Witlin, Farid Mattar & Baha M. Sibai,
pregnancy and cesarean delivery ....
Postpartum Stroke: A Twenty-Year Experience, 183 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 87
(2000). Instead of mentioning Parlodel, the study found that there was "no association [between]
conductive anesthesia" and postpartum stroke. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Editorial, Announcement of InappropriateActs in the Publication Process, 195 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 886, 887 (2006).

108. See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants at 1, Perry v.
Novartis Pharms. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.aei.org/research/liability/subjectAreas/pagelD. 1378,projectlD.23/default.asp.
109. Id.
110.

Id.atio.
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this letter made clear that failure to warn claims that do not directly
conflict with FDA regulatory decisions remain viable and can be
interpreted to be consistent with the argument that there can be only
conflict preemption (a direct and positive conflict) when the FDA has
been asked to consider a warning, reviewed all the data, and rejected it,
that is, a case-by-case approach to preemption. 1"1' The Perry amicus
letter, however, raises more questions than it answers in that the FDA
typically does not reject warnings, but just determines that data is either
conclusive or inconclusive about the need for a warning at a given point
in time. Moreover, labeling gets "negotiated" between the FDA and the
manufacturer, and thus decisions can be made for reasons distinct from
the merits, as can happen in any negotiation. Further, would this result in
perpetual debate about what the FDA would or would not do? Would
this limited Perry preemption result in a situation where the FDA will
step in and specifically provide the answer in individual litigations? It
would seem that the current Bush administration FDA is unlikely to
flatly say, no, we would have not rejected a specific warning and thus
plaintiff may proceed. In arguing against Perry preemption, plaintiffs
should argue that the pharmaceutical company has the continuous duty,
even after receiving market approval, to ensure the safety of its products
on the market, and as such, the pharmaceutical company has the burden
of showing that it proposed a warning or new warning or label change,
submitted all relevant clinical data, and that the FDA explicitly rejected
this clinical data. Plaintiffs should also argue these are factual issues that
cannot be decided on summary judgment or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) motions.
The evolving position of the FDA may be important as to the
outcome in a pending certiorari petition concerning the preamble
preemption issue. The Vermont Supreme Court, the country's first
highest state court to address the claims that the FDA preamble preempts
failure to warn pharmaceutical litigation, handily dismissed such claims

11l. This limited view of preemption was adopted by the Perry court. See Perry,456 F. Supp.
2d at 684-85; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 277 (E.D.N.Y. June
11, 2007) ("FDA would consider preempted only those state-law adequacy of warning claims which
seek to impose liability for failure to include labeling language already rejected by the FDA.")
(emphasis added). For an old but relevant law journal article on the topic of limited preemption, see
Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision:FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7,
11 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Lohr, including how the FDA's position in
Lohr recognized that "[r]egulation cannot protect against all possible injuries that might result from
use of a device over time. Preemption of all such claims would result in the loss of a significant
layer of consumer protection").
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as being without merit in Levine v. Wyeth. 112 The drug manufacturer
Wyeth filed a petition for certiorari, last term, and the Supreme Court,
on May 21, 2007 expressly invited the Solicitor General to file a brief in
this case expressing the views of the United States. No brief has been
filed to date. If a brief is filed, and the Supreme Court grants certiorari
and defers to the administration view, the landscape of drug safety and
victim's rights may be detrimentally altered given the current
administration's anti-consumer stance.

IV.

CONCLUSION

We believe that American consumers possibly may be using a
number of medications that have serious risks, due to the inability of the
current FDA scheme to meaningfully police pharmaceutical
manufacturer misconduct. To end the vital role that litigation plays in
uncovering hidden drug dangers and providing some recompense to
injured consumers would be an unnecessary end to the prominent role of
the states as the prime protector of their citizens' health and safety. 1'3 As
potentially recognized by the FDA's possible retreat from its earlier
position, Congress, in enacting the consumer protection statutes did not
and could not have intended the nightmare that will result if FDA
preemption of private common law pharmaceuticals cases occurs.

112. No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006). Petition for Certiorari Filed, 75
USLW 3500 (Mar. 12, 2007) (No. 06-1249).
113. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (noting "prominence of the States in
matters of public health and safety").
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